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SECURITIES REGULATIONS IN CHINA AND THEIR
CORPORATE FINANCE IMPLICATIONS ON
STATE ENTERPRISE REFORM
K. Matthew Wong*
INTRODUCTION
When the Communist Party took control in China in 1949, it de-
cided to implement a centrally controlled economic system. Under
this system, the government abolished free markets and nationalized
most private companies into state enterprises. Further, annual pro-
duction targets were set by planning committees in various levels of
the government. Chinese Marxists theorized that a planned economy
would better maximize productivity and efficiency because it would
avoid economic fluctuations such as unemployment and depressions
that frequently occur in a free market economy.' In practice, how-
ever, this planned economic system proved all but unmanageable be-
cause there was no incentive to pursue operational efficiency. Field
managers in the system were not held accountable for any profit or
loss of their businesses. As a result, the industrial sector generated
massive waste and losses.2 To correct this trend, China embarked on
its latest reform movement in the late 1970s and the economy has
since been remarkably transformed.
As a result of its reform program which began with the promulga-
tion of the joint venture law in 1979,3 China has been very successful
in attracting foreign investment. China now ranks second only to the
United States in terms of foreign direct investment inflows.' From
* Associate Professor of Finance, St. John's University, N.Y. Ph.D. (Finance),
University of Mississippi, 1990; Chartered Financial Analyst, 1992; J.D. expected,
Fordham University School of Law, 1997.
1. Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporate& The First Corporation
Law of the People's Republic of China, 20 Yale J. Int'l L 273, 277 (1995).
2. Id.; see also David Eu, Note, Financial Reforms and Corporate Governance in
China, 34 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 469, 470 (1996) ('hese inefficient state enterprises
are the result of decades of central planning, during which they faced distorted incen-
tives and few, if any, financial constraints.") (footnote omitted); infra part I (discuss-
ing the condition of the state sector).
3. Law of the PRC on Sino-Foreign Joint Equity Enterprises, as amended, China
L. Foreign Bus. (CCII) 6-500 (1979). This was the first commercial law enacted as
part of China's modem economic reform program.
4. Richard Brecher, Considering the Options, China Bus. Rev., May-June 1995, at
10, 10. In general, there are three types of foreign-invested enterprises ("FIE"s), the
equity joint ventures ("EJV"s), contractual joint ventures ("CIV"s), and wholly for-
eign owned enterprises. The difference between EJVs and CJVs is that whereas part-
ners in EJVs are entitled to the profits according to their respective proportion of
capital contributions, in a CJV the partners would simply stipulate their profit shares
regardless of their actual capital contributions. Approximately SUS34 billion in for-
eign capital were injected into investment projects in 1993 alone. Id. By June 1994,
China had more than 200,000 foreign-invested enterprises and over 24,000 foreign
representative offices. Id. at 10-11; see also Vivienne Bath, Introducing the "Limited
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1983 to 1989, foreign direct investment in China grew at an annual
rate of 34%.5 This growth rate accelerated to 60% per year from 1989
to 1993.6 Between 1979 and 1993, China had a real economic growth
rate of 9% per year, making it the fastest growing economy in the
world during the period.7
The rapid pace of China's economic reforms and general economic
growth requires the development of a modem financial market to fa-
cilitate the efficient exchange of economic resources. In addition to
accelerating the development of the credit markets, China experi-
mented with the creation of equity stocks and a public stock market.8
Beginning in 1986, China allowed limited stock trading in the Over-
the-Counter markets in selected cities.9 In 1990, the first national
stock exchange was established in Shanghai ("Shanghai Stock Ex-
change"). 10 Six months later in 1991, a second national exchange was
created in Shenzhen ("Shenzhen Stock Exchange"), a city in southern
China." Each of these two national exchanges are regulated by
slightly different sets of local regulations that reflect both local condi-
tions and the central government's desire to explore the effects of var-
ious securities regulations.'
Company", China Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 50, 50-51 (discussing the three types of
joint venture and the new possibility of forming a limited company).
5. Francis A. Lees & K. Thomas Liaw, Foreign Participation in China's Banking
and Securities Markets 127 (1996).
6. Id.
7. Id at 126. See The People's Republic of China Is One of the Fastest Growing
Economies in the World, Bus. Am., Feb. 1994. The average growth rate between 1994
and 1995 was around 12%. Andrew X. Qian, Why Does Not the Rising Water Lift the
Boat? Internationalization of the Stock Markets and the Securities Regulatory Regime
in China, 29 Int'l Law. 615, 615 (1995).
8. For a discussion on the development of Chinese credit markets, see Keqian Bi,
The Credit Markets in China, Colum. J. of World Bus., Fall 1993, at 76.
9. Henry R. Zheng, Business Organization and Securities Laws of the People's
Republic of China, 43 Bus. Law. 549, 607 (1988).
10. Robert Nottle, The Development of Securities Markets in China in the 1990s,
11 Company & Sec. L.J. 503, 504 (1993).
11. Idt
12. See infra part III (discussing China's securities regulatory regime including the
local regulations).
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With the enactment of the provisional National Securities Law'3 in
1993 and the Company Law'4 in 1994, a preliminary model of China's
securities regulatory regime has emerged. To gain acceptance within
the current political environment, however, this regime has incorpo-
rated significant socialist characteristics which distort the normal func-
tions of a financial market"'5 As discussed below, the current
regulatory scheme will likely prevent China from achieving its goal of
using the equity market to rejuvenate its ailing state industrial sector.
The partial free market system that exists today in China simply does
not allow the efficient allocation of scarce economic resources. 6
China's economic reforms of the last decade, meanwhile, have also
changed the fundamental characteristics of domestic enterprises. In
1980, at the beginning of the modem reform movement, the state sec-
tor-as represented by state enterprises-accounted for 76% of the
gross industrial output in China.'7 By 1991, this figure had fallen to
53%.18 The state sector today produces less than half of the industrial
output in China. 19 Within the next few years, the state sector's output
share is expected to decline significantly further.20 Notwithstanding
their declining share of industrial output, state enterprises as a whole
13. Provisional Regulations on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of
Stocks, China L. Foreign Bus. (CCH) 13-574 (1993) [hereinafter National Securities
Law]. These regulations were approved by the State Council, the highest administra-
tive government body in China, on April 22, 1993. Id These provisional regulations
supersede local municipal laws governing securities trading, unless similar local rules
are more stringent. Many of the local regulatory laws in Shanghai and Shenzhen are
still in effect in areas where the National Securities Law does not address, the local
laws are the primary law.
Meanwhile, China has been working on the comprehensive National Securities
Regulations legislation for a number of years. The promulgation of this legislation
has been postponed numerous times for undisclosed reasons. See Kevin Murphy,
Lacking Ruldes, China Plays Difficult Market Game, Int'l Herald Trib., May 28, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current News File (noting that "those involved in
the drafting process [of the National Securities Regulations] say they cannot even
predict when the work might be done"). Presumably, the final legislation would in-
corporate most of the provisional regulations and regional practices.
14. Company Law of the People's Republic of China, China L Foreign Bus.
(CCH) 13-518 (1993) [hereinafter Company Law].
15. See infra parts I, IV (discussing the securities regulatory regime and its im-
pacts on the pricing of stocks).
16. One alternative to this economic dilemma is to return to the socialist central
planning system and simply overhaul the planning process. However, such an alterna-
tive would directly contradict the major goal of China's modern reform movement-
breaking away from a rigidly planned economy.
17. Aimen Chen, Chinese Industrial Structure in Transition: The Emergence of
Stock-Offering Firms, 26 Comp. Econ. Stud. 1, 9 (Winter 1994).
18. Id
19. Joseph Kahn, Private Takeover: Spreading Capitalism, New Entrepreneurs Are
Remaking China, Wall St. J., July 20, 1995, at Al, A8 (noting that in the first half of
1995, state sector only produced 40% of overall output).
20. Breaking the Taboo, Euromoney, Feb. 1996, at 80, 80 (remarking that "China's
state statistical bureau expects the state's [industrial production] share to shrink to
25% by the end of the century").
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are still critical to China, given that they are the largest employer in
the country. In 1993, this sector employed 75% of China's urban la-
bor force.2 Therefore, any state sector reform will have a significant
impact on the national economy and perhaps social stability.'-
Viewed broadly, China's reform movement is a direct response to
the gross inefficiency that prevailed within the planned economy. In
many ways, China's current problems with its state sector are similar
to those encountered in Russia and Eastern Europe.2 Years of direc-
tives from static state planning and a complete lack of competition
have led to bloated bureaucratic management structures and obsolete
manufacturing facilities. 4 At the same time, sagging demand for the
state sector's inferior products further aggravates these problems.
Consequently, throughout the reform movement, the government has
always focused on improving efficiency through introduction of for-
eign capital, technology transfer from western countries, and ex-
ports.25  Legal reforms and changes in economic institutions are
implemented merely to accommodate this overriding national goal of
achieving operational efficiency.
This Note examines the proper role of China's stock market in the
state sector reform. It argues that the current securities regulatory
regime hinders the true functions of an efficient stock market and has
significant corporate finance consequences.
21. Preston M. Torbert, China's Evolving Company Legislation: A Status Report,
14 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 1, 2 (1993). In 1993, the state sector employed 110 million
workers and 340 million people depended on the state enterprises for supporting serv-
ices. Deborah K. Johns, Note, Reforming the State-Enterprise Property Relationship in
the People's Republic of China: The Corporatization of State-Owned Enterprises, 16
Mich. J. Int'l L. 911, 915 nn.19-20 (1995) (quoting Cycle of Debt at Heart of Problem,
S. China Morning Post, Sept. 26, 1994, at 24).
22. In addition to manufacturing, state enterprises provide many critical social
services, including the operation of child-care facilities and hospitals. Donald C.
Clarke, What's Law Got To Do With It? Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in
China, 10 UCLA Pac. Basin LU. 1, 44 (1991). Closing down state enterprises there-
fore carries an enormous social cost. Id. at 54. Currently, state enterprises theoreti-
cally have the legal right to dismiss their employees. This right, however, is almost
never exercised. ld. at 43.
23. Torbert, supra note 21, at 6; see also Paul Cantor & James Kraus, Changing
Patterns of Ownership Rights in the People's Republic of China: A Legal and Eco-
nomic Analysis in the Context of Economic Reforms and Social Conditions, 23 Vand.
J. Transnat'l L. 479, 517-31 (1990) (comparing China's experience in transforming the
state enterprises to the experiences of Chile and Russia).
24. See generally Nayan Chanda, The End Is Near, Far E. Econ. Rev., Feb. 23,
1995, at 48 (discussing the problems facing state enterprises in China).
25. Some commentators observe that the goals of the current reforms are to elimi-
nate economic waste and improve efficiency by implementing three specific measures:
(1) decentralization of economic decision making at the micro-level; (2) reliance on
market forces and material incentives to alter undesirable economic behaviors; and
(3) opening the economy to external competition with foreign investment. Mei Xia et
al., The Re-Emerging Securities Market in China 22 (1992); see also Johns, supra note
21, at 912 (noting that "much of the reform.., focused on solving the efficiency and
related problems of state-owned enterprises").
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Part I of this Note discusses the economic difficulties currently fac-
ing the state sector. It then examines the government's efforts to con-
vert state enterprises into publicly listed joint stock companies as well
as the government's intention to utilize the stock market to provide
funds for state sector modernization. Part II examines some of the
contentious political issues surrounding China's creation of a stock
market to actively trade shares of converted state enterprises.
Part III scrutinizes the current securities regulatory regime. This
regime, although relatively limited in its overall reach compared with
regimes in fully developed capital markets, contains detailed micro-
finance provisions in areas that affect the daily operations of state
firms.26 Most importantly, current regulations which separate com-
mon stocks into different classes create substantial price distortions in
the market, thereby defeating the corporate finance functions of stock
trading. This Note points out that in addition to providing a market
for fund raising, an equally important role of an efficient stock market
is to provide firm managers with a means to fairly estimate the com-
pany's cost of capital in order to make appropriate project investment
decisions.
Finally, part IV illustrates the potential corporate finance problems
created by the current securities regulatory regime. Grounded in
modem finance theory, this part shows that the current securities reg-
ulatory regime in China can produce significant mispricing problems
for different classes of stocks with the same underlying rights. Conse-
quently, managers in the state sector cannot rely on the market to
estimate their own internal cost of capital. Without this cost estima-
tion, there is no reliable guidance for company investment decisions.
Indeed, even if most of the approximately 100,000 state enterprises2 7
were converted into joint stock companiesm and were traded publicly,
China probably still could not stop the massive economic waste gener-
ated by the state sector. This Note concludes that if China hopes to
rely on the market to improve the efficiency of its state sector, it must
integrate its stock market by collapsing the various stock classes.
I. ECONOMIC REFORMS AND THE STATE ENTERPRISES
To provide a background for this study, this part describes modern
China's economic reforms and briefly surveys the condition of the
state sector in China. Generally, the industrial infra-structure in
China consists of state enterprises, collectively owned enterprises-
principally in rural areas and in agriculture-and private enterprises.
26. See infra part Im (examining the securities regulatory regime).
27. See Chanda, supra note 24, at 48 (remarking that "China has a whopping
108,000 state enterprises").
28. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (defining joint stock company).
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As noted above, state enterprises2 9 remain the most important sector
in the Chinese economy because the finished goods manufactured by
these firms are critical to the economy and the sector employs a large
percentage of the population.3" In China, state enterprises pervade
every sector of the economy, but they are especially prevalent in
heavy industries that require substantial capital investment. Accord-
ingly, the government has focused its attention on improving effi-
ciency in this sector. Notwithstanding the current interest in
increasing private participation in the state enterprise modernization
process, it is clear from the Chinese Constitution and other laws that
the government will not relinquish all of its ownership interest in this
sector.31
At its inception, the Communist government in China established a
centralized economic system based on socialist ideals. 32 Following the
Soviet model, the State Planning Committee would decide the eco-
nomic priorities and incorporate them in the country's five-year
plans.33 Economic growth under this system was achieved by blunt
increases in material inputs and labor rather than through attempts to
efficiently allocate resources.3 4 As a result, by the mid-1970s, China's
economic growth lagged far behind that of other industrialized na-
tions. It became increasingly clear to the Chinese leadership that
China needed to open its doors to foreign investments. In December
1978, at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of China, the government announced a shift in its focus
from class struggle to economic development. This shift marked the
beginning of China's modem economic reforms.35
China's senior leader Deng Xiao Ping described the new policy of
openness to foreign capital and entrepreneurs as "socialism with Chi-
nese characteristics. '36 According to one commentator,
The reforms were prompted by dissatisfaction with the results of the
traditional system of collectivized agriculture and planned industry
29. A typical state enterprise is controlled by one or more government units. It is
basically situated at the bottom of the hierarchy of state planning. At the top of this
system of planning is the State Planning Commission ("SPC") which determines the
initial output targets. SPC then modifies these targets according to the various needs
of ministries and provinces. The individual targets are then disaggregated to individ-
ual state enterprises. Clarke, supra note 22, at 5.
30. See supra note 21.
31. See infra note 54 (indicating that the Chinese Constitution and various statutes
stipulate the supremacy of state ownership).
32. See Xia et al., supra note 25, at 19-22 (describing the pre-reform economic
structure in China).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Clarke, supra note 22, at 4; see also Cantor & Kraus, supra note 23, at 489
(noting that the Third Plenary Session in 1978 "marked the start of the privatization
movement and the re-emergence of forms of private property ownership").
36. Nottle, supra note 10, at 503.
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and commerce. Their essential aim was the devolution of economic
decision making power from higher to lower level governmental
bodies and, in some cases, the transfer of such power out of the
bureaucratic hierarchy altogether.37
Before the reforms, state enterprises simply obtained investment
funds from the state and produced whatever output quota that was
required by the state. Any additional profits were remitted to the
state. Under this system, there was no incentive to seek growth or
change to meet market demand. Further, because it was impossible
for a firm under a state plan to precisely estimate the actual operating
costs, state enterprise managers' concern about cost overrun was min-
iscule. Whenever there was a budget shortfall, the manager could
simply plead for a larger budget. In effect, the enterprises were oper-
ating under a "soft budget constraint" wherein economic waste was
irrelevant.38
As an early part of its economic reform, the government introduced
a profit retention system in 1980 that allowed state enterprises to re-
tain a portion of their profits.39 The new system held managers re-
sponsible for the performance of the enterprises.40 At the same time,
the government significantly reduced direct allocation of state funds
to state enterprises.41 Firms were forced to obtain project finance cap-
ital from a variety of sources including the traditional state funding,
interest bearing loans from banks, and even equity or bond issu-
ances.42 The net result of these reforms is that today an enterprise
must compare its own cost of capital with the rate of return from the
project.
The problem with this new arrangement between government and
local enterprises is that determining profits or losses in the state indus-
trial sector can be a very difficult and irrational exercise. Most goods
used by the industry in China still have fixed prices. Thus, as one
commentator argues, "[u]ntil the price system is reformed, therefore,
37. Clarke, supra note 22, at 3. The government began the reform by first replac-
ing the commune system in rural farms with a responsibility system where a single
family unit-rather than a commune which typically combines several villages-is re-
sponsible for fulfilling government quotas. Output exceeding the quotas could be
sold to the public and the family unit could retain the profits. After the initial success
of the rural reforms, the reform movement expanded to include the urban industrial
sectors. Instead of providing rigid planning, the reformed state planning system now
merely regulated the markets and let market forces determine the flow of goods and
capital. See generally China Int'l Econ. Consultants, Inc., The China Investment
Guide 23 (4th ed. 1989) (describing China's economic system). As discussed in this
part, it is in the industrial sector where China's reforms are currently having the most
difficulties.
38. Clarke, supra note 22, at 9.
39. See Xia et al., supra note 25, at 31.
40. I&
41. Id. at 33.
42. Id
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profitability will be a poor indicator of efficiency. If the output price
is fixed high relative to the fixed price for inputs, profitability will be
high regardless of efficiency."'43
In essence, identifying money-losing businesses in a fixed-price
economy is much more complicated than it would be in a free market
system. In a fixed-price system, it is difficult to ascertain whether the
enterprise losses are attributable to mismanagement or to
macroeconomic structural problems for which the enterprise is not at
fault." But even if prices on the factors of production 45 are not fixed,
as discussed in part IV below, a state enterprise will still have difficul-
ties estimating its own cost of capital and making an informed decision
on project investments, because the stock market cannot provide ade-
quate information on the fair market value of the enterprise's stock.
Despite these well-intentioned reforms, the late 1980s saw further
deterioration in the state sector. In the first half of 1988, state enter-
prises incurred operating losses of RMB 6.87 billion yuan,46 more than
the amount for all of 1987.47 The monetary austerity measures en-
forced in late 1988 also caused huge amounts of inter-enterprise
debt-close to RMB 100 billion yuan by November 1989.48 By 1993,
the average return on investment in the state sector had dropped to
1.9% from 11.8% in 1985.49 It had become obvious that measures
were necessary to address these structural problems in the state
sector.
43. Clarke, supra note 22, at 12.
44. China's policy makers are probably aware of this problem. This might explain
why bankruptcy of a state enterprise is still a rare event, despite the implementation
of bankruptcy legislation in 1988 which allowed money losing enterprises to be closed
down. One commentator concludes that the present Bankruptcy Law is mostly inef-
fective to correct state enterprise behavior without reforming the price system. Id. at
55. In addition, state enterprises can rely on the safe harbor clause in article 3 of the
Bankruptcy Law, which provides that enterprises should not be forced into bank-
ruptcy if losses are not due to their own fault. Id. at 53.
45. These factors are commonly identified as land, labor, and capital.
46. Yuan is the dollar unit of Renminbi (RMB), the currency of China. The ex-
change rate is currently pegged by the Chinese government at approximate $US1 =
RMB 8.3 yuan. See Currency Trading, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1996, at C18.
47. Clarke, supra note 22, at 52. In the first three quarters of 1994, close to half of
the audited 100,000 state enterprises lost money, totaling over RMB 29 billion yuan.
Johns, supra note 21, at 915 n.21.
48. See Clarke, supra note 22, at 52 n.234. This is the so-called "triangular debt"
problem in China. Enterprises owed money to each other which could not be set off
by mutual obligations; no one had the money to payoff its own debt unless the money
it was owed was paid first. Id. For example, suppose there were three enterprises A,
B, and C. If A owed money to B, B owed money to C, and C, in turn, also had
borrowed from A, none of them would be able to clear its own debt unless one of
them was paid off first. Id. By 1995, this "triangular debt" had mushroomed to nearly
RMB 600 billion yuan which amounted to one third of China's industrial output. Lin-
coln Kaye, Fire When Ready, Far E. Econ. Rev., Feb. 23, 1995, at 50, 52.
49. Chanda, supra note 24, at 48 (quoting official Chinese statistics).
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As a commentator observes, "development of securities markets
was intended, amongst other things, to extricate the Peoples Republic
of China (PRC) government from the funding problems arising from
substantial budget deficits, due in part to the heavy subsidies granted
to loss-making, State-owned enterprises."5 It is believed that an ac-
tive stock market will enable state enterprises to utilize the huge per-
sonal deposits in China5' and subject their management to the
stimulations and disciplines of market forces.'
II. IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE STOCK MARKET
The emergence of stock markets in China symbolizes a significant
departure from socialist practice and raises many political issues.5 3
Under the traditional socialist system, state ownership of major eco-
nomic establishments on behalf of the "whole people" is considered
an essential socialist attribute and the ideal economic structure.'
Thus, prior to the 1980s, allowing individuals to acquire an equity in-
terest in a state enterprise was thought to be antithetical to socialist
ideology.5 5 The notion of individual stock ownership also challenges
the ideal of state ownership of the means of production. 56 Indeed, on
various occasions the government has stressed that privatization is un-
acceptable in China.57
50. Nottle, supra note 10, at 503.
51. Personal savings in China are estimated to be between SUS200 to SUS300
billion. Id.
52. 1L (stating that "[a]s part of the process, it was hoped that exposing State
enterprises to the rigors of the capital market would improve internal management
and raise productivity").
53. Further aggravating the potential political problem is the fact that most of the
companies listed on the two exchanges were former state enterprises. See Kou Hal,
Chinese Companies Listed to Develop Modern Enterprises, Xinhua News Agency, Jan.
20, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current News File.
54. Some commentators observe that "the government [seeks to preserve] the
Marxist-Leninist principle of ownership of the means of production by the people, as
represented by the state." Art & Gu, supra note 1, at 283. Further, article 6 of
China's 1982 Constitution states "[t]he basis of the socialist economic system of the
People's Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means of production,
namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working peo-
ple." Id. at n.62 (citation omitted); see also James V. Feinerman, The Evolving Chi-
nese Enterprise, 15 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 203, 204 (1989) (referencing same
passage of Chinese Constitution).
55. Zheng, supra note 9, 604-05 (noting the debates of socialist ideology over
stock issuance).
56. Chen, supra note 17, at 1.
57. See g, Andrew X. Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and
the Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 62, 83
(1993). Some commentators characterize the current government practices as
corporatization rather then privatization. See generally id. at 92 (noting that a better
description of the process is corporatization); Art & Gu, supra note 1, at 282-83 (ob-
serving that "China's program is not privatization ... it is 'corporatization,' a more
limited reform"); Johns, supra note 21, at 934-36 (same).
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Nevertheless, the government in the 1980s needed to find ways to
solve the state sector's problems. Following the successful preliminary
structural reform in the rural areas, in 1984 China expanded the pro-
gram into a comprehensive national economic reform and signifi-
cantly increased the decision-making power of state enterprises.58 In
so doing, the government announced that "the state's right to own and
to run businesses 'may be appropriately separated."' 59 As a result,
government efforts were centered on increasing the efficiency of state
enterprises by separating management from ownership. In most
cases, this meant less micro-management from state planning authori-
ties.6 0 Ironically, the classical business-agency problem became appar-
ent soon afterward; with greater autonomy and bonuses tied to
profitability of the entities, business managers began to focus solely on
short term profitability rather than long term investment decisions. 61
Unlike matured market economies where the financial marketplace
would discipline management misbehavior or incompetence, China
lacked adequate market mechanisms such as the threat of bankruptcy
and a sizable group of experienced investors capable of scrutinizing
the company's stock performance and monitoring and disciplining
management.62
Currently, the Chinese government appears to be sidestepping the
sensitive issue of ownership by instead focusing discussion on the
property rights that stock represents.63 Indeed, the concept of a nar-
rowly defined property right in stock is theoretically appealing in a
transitional socialist economy. From a finance theory standpoint, the
fair market price of a share of stock today is nothing more than the
present value of the aggregate future income that the owner of the
share can reasonably expect, taking into account the expected risk.
This future income is commonly represented in finance literature by
the stock dividends.' 4 Thus, owning a share of a company's stock
would not have to be viewed as entitling the shareholder to a piece of
58. See supra part I.
59. Zheng, supra note 9, at 604 (citation omitted); see also Qian, supra note 57, at
72-85 (discussing the theoretical debates in China regarding private ownership).
60. See generally Torbert, supra note 21 (discussing the evolutionary company leg-
islation in China).
61. Before reform, the state acted as owner-manager. Thus, there was no separa-
tion of interest between principal and agent. Qian, supra note 57, at 75.
62. See, e.g., James C. Van Home, Financial Management and Policy 3-4 (10th ed.
1995) (discussing the role of the stock market in alleviating agency problems).
63. See, e.g., Qian, supra note 57, at 77-80 (debating the separation of ownership
from property rights); Johns, supra note 21, at 934-36 (discussing the property right
relationship between the state and the state enterprise).
64. In most finance textbooks, the idea is presented mathematically as:
P = S(D,/(1+K,);
where t denotes the time periods which run from 1 to infinity; P is the fair market
value of the share today; D denotes dividends; and K is the risk-adjusted discount rate
demanded by the investor. See, e.g, Van Home, supra note 62, at 29-34 (discussing the
valuation model).
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the enterprise itself. Rather, the shareholder is seen merely as partici-
pating in profit sharing of the enterprise's future income stream.6
Absent legislative characterization of the exact ownership nature of
an equity share,66 holding equity would be considered fundamentally
equivalent to holding debt-which is clearly devoid of ownership. It
follows that shareholding would not challenge the notion of state own-
ership of assets in China.
However, this is not the only problem the introduction of a stock
market in China creates for the government. The purchase of equity
stocks by firms diverts money from the bond market and traditional
bank saving deposits. Major state planning remains dependent upon
these two sources for capital and control. In addition, new projects
supported through the raising of equity capital often conflict with
state plans and create bottlenecks in material supplies in the
economy.67
Further complicating the issue is that, from 1949 to 1978, prior to
the current reforms, the Chinese government invested about RMB
600 billion yuan in the fixed assets of state enterprises. If these state-
owned enterprises were converted into privately-owned enterprises, it
would be impossible for private enterprises and individual investors to
absorb this large amount of assets. It has been argued that setting up
joint stock companies is the most effective way to convert a state own-
ership system into a share system because a joint stock company theo-
retically combines the interests of all involved parties-the
government, the state enterprises, employees, and other individual
investors.68
These various considerations help explain the numerous conflicting
provisions in the current securities regulatory regime. Part IlI exam-
ines the significant features of the regime.
65. In other words, the shareholder merely possesses the right to future profits.
She does not presently own any physical property (the underlying assets of the com-
pany). In essence, the shareholder is paid a rent periodically on the company's use of
her capital in project investments.
66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
67. Zheng, supra note 9, at 606.
68. Some authors observe,
Technically, the fixed assets invested by the government in an enterprise
would be priced and converted into shares and owned by the government.
The accumulated retained earnings of the enterprise, although difficult to
calculate, would be converted into shares owned by the enterprise itself.
The enterprise could also issue shares to its own employees or to other en-
terprises and individual investors. The board of directors, consisting of the
representatives of all interested parties, would decide the management is-
sues of the enterprise. The state would not withdraw its shares from the
enterprise but would be able to transfer or sell them to other state entities.
Xia et al., supra note 25, at 94.
Because the government still maintains the largest shares, the demand of capital
infusion from the private sector will be more limited.
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III. SECURITIES REGULATORY REGIME
China's current securities regulatory regime primarily consists of
two sets of laws: the newly enacted Company Law69 and the "securi-
ties laws." The securities laws at p resent are comprised of the provi-
sional National Securities Law70 and local securities regulations.
China has yet to pass a permanent national securities law regulating
stock trading.71
Although patterned on western schemes, China's existing securities
regulatory regime distinctly reflects the various competing political
and economic considerations within the country.72 China's central
government undoubtedly hopes that the regulatory regime will help
transform the state enterprises as a whole into a modernized sector.
Many provisions under the regime clearly envision state enterprise
conversions. Nonetheless, the regime contains numerous operational
restrictions for both the individual firms and the market as a whole.
These restrictions nullify many of the benefits of a free stock market
and a private enterprise system.
This part first surveys the salient provisions of the Company Law,
which explicitly allows joint stock companies to be listed publicly in
the stock market. The part then examines the current securities laws
and contrasts the local regulations with the provisional national law.
As seen below, the current securities regulatory regime in China spe-
cifically classify stocks based on the nature of the owners. This pecu-
liar classification system results in significant distortion in stock
pricing. The classification system is analyzed in this part as well.
A. Company Law
Before 1994, even with active equity stock trading on the two na-
tional exchanges, China lacked any national corporate legal scheme
that clearly established the rights and responsibilities of the sharehold-
ers and management of publicly traded companies. On July 1, 1994,
China's national Company Law became effective. It uniformly applies
to both domestic and foreign investment enterprises. One of the main
purposes of the Company Law is to reform existing state enterprises
and to allow foreign investment in these enterprises.7 3 The Company
Law governs two types of corporate entities: "limited liability compa-
nies" and "companies limited by shares." The latter are commonly
referred to as "joint stock companies. '74 The basic difference be-
69. Company Law, supra note 14.
70. National Securities Law, supra note 13.
71. See Murphy, supra note 13 (stating that the drafting of the permanent national
securities law has been delayed numerous times).
72. See Qian, supra note 57, at 91-92.
73. Torbert, supra note 21, at 2.
74. See generally Company Law, supra note 14 (detailing articles governing lim-
ited liability companies and companies limited by shares). Conceptually, the limited
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tween them is that shares of joint stock companies can be publicly
traded while shares of limited liability companies cannot.7 Also,
through provisions such as those defining the powers of management
and stockholders, the Company Law provides a clear legal basis for
joint stock companies to participate in China's expanding "securitiza-
tion" program."
Significantly, the Company Law gives state enterprises an opportu-
nity to follow a stipulated procedure to reincorporate and reorganize
as a joint stock company with widely held shares.77 Converted state
enterprises may also raise needed capital in the stock market when
they meet the listing requirements and regulations of the exchanges.78
Under the Company Law, a joint stock company may be established
by promotion or by subscription.79 The majority of the five or more
promoters or sponsors must be domiciliaries of China.80 These two
requirements are probably motivated by the need to develop China's
infant domestic underwriting industry and to prevent well financed
and experienced international securities firms from monopolizing the
underwriting process. Reflecting China's desire for foreign capital
and the business reality of a sizable foreign participation in the stock
market before the promulgation of the Company Law, there is no na-
tionality requirement for the shareholder of a joint stock company,'
Foreign nationals, however, are not allowed to purchase the "A
shares" which are common stocks issued to Chinese residents for do-
mestic trading only.82 If the company is formed by subscription, the
promoters must undertake to buy at least 35% of the shares and keep
them for three years to provide a measure of stability for the new
company.as A significant result of this provision is that the manage-
liability company is similar to a close corporation in the U.S., whereas the joint stock
company has its counterpart in the publicly held corporation in the U.S. See Art &
Gu, supra note 1, at 291.
75. See Company Law, supra note 14, art. 144 ("The assignment of shares by a
shareholder shall be conducted at legally established stock exchanges.").
76. It is also referred to as the corporatization program. See supra note 57.
77. See Company Law of the PRC, China Bus. L. Guide (CCH) 14-120 (1995).
The law, however, does not specifically deal with the issue of pre-existing debts found
in most state enterprises. Presumably this question will be answered at the valuation
stage when shares are issued. That is, the final initial public offering stock price will
take into account the size of the enterprise's debt.
78. The state enterprise must also be first approved by the government for listing.
See Company Law, supra note 14, arts. 151, 153.
79. 1l art. 74 (stating that "[a] company limited by shares may adopt the promo-
tion method or share float method [ie. subscription] for its establishment"). Under
the promotion method, the promoters are required to purchase all the company
shares and can then resell them at retail. Under the subscription method, individual
outside investors would be able to purchase the residual shares after the promoters
bought a portion of the available company shares. Id.
80. Id. art. 75.
81. See Company Law, supra note 14.
82. See infra part III.C.
83. See Company Law, supra note 14, art. 83.
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ment of converted state enterprises will be subject to monitoring by
shareholders with a significant holding of the company's shares for a
fairly lengthy period of time.
Another provision of the Company Law is the requirement that the
company set aside a portion of its profits in a reserve fund until the
fund equals 50% of the company's capital.84 This seemingly paternal-
istic restriction is apparently designed to protect China's predomi-
nantly inexperienced shareholders. Although the requirement
probably has the effect of stabilizing dividends and reducing the
chance of bankruptcy, it significantly reduces management's flexibility
in reinvesting the company's profits. It also infringes upon the man-
agement's right to deploy its own financial resources. Because state
enterprises tend to have a relatively large capital base, a consequence
of the reserve fund requirement is that dividend payout from con-
verted state enterprises would be extremely limited at least in the first
few years. Their stocks, therefore, may not be very appealing to over-
seas stock investors who often expect to receive stock dividends.
Under the Company Law, companies are also required to "consider
the opinions of the company's trade union or employees when discuss-
ing and determining matters related to the employee's immediate or
vital interests."85 It is not known how much protection this provision
will provide the workers, however, because of the Company Law's
deliberately vague language. There is also a rather unique provision
in the Company Law that mandates establishment of a supervisory
board elected by workers to protect their interests, as well as share-
holders' rights.86 Such a board might be important in China because
of the large number of small and powerless shareholders. Nonethe-
less, this provision further limits management's freedom.
The Company Law permits converted state enterprises to issue cor-
porate bonds, increasing the financing flexibility of management
through the use of debt. All bond issuances, however, must be ap-
proved by the relevant authorities-presumably the central bank87-
and the total amount of bonds is limited to a maximum of 40% of
total assets.88 With these provisions, the policy makers evidently in-
tend to prevent private corporate debt financing from competing with
state plan-funding requirements which are substantially financed by
the issuance of government bonds and direct borrowing from state
banks.89
84. Id art. 177.
85. Id art. 121.
86. Id art. 124.
87. The People's Bank of China is the central bank in China.
88. See Company Law of the PRC, China Bus. L. Guide (CCH) 14-300 (1995).
89. This provision can also be viewed as another attempt by the government to
prevent enterprises from taking excessive risk.
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Ideally, to effectuate its state enterprise restructuring, China should
implement legislation that provides broad guidelines to safeguard
public interests. Meanwhile, the law should leave adequate room for
management to optimize operations. In contrast to this ideal, the cur-
rent Company Law contains some surprisingly intrusive restrictions at
the management level, as noted above, thereby hindering the process
of modernization.
B. Securities Laws
Stock issuance and trading in China are regulated under a provi-
sional national legislation (i.e. the National Securities Law) and local
municipal laws enacted in Shanghai and Shenzhen, where the two na-
tional stock exchanges are located. These securities laws delineate the
basic listing requirements, the regulations of the securities market,
and the disclosure provisions for listed companies. The basic purposes
of the securities laws are to protect investors from fraud and market
manipulation.
The National Securities Law was first promulgated by the central
government in mid-1993. Residual regulations governing listings and
trading of shares were enacted by the Shanghai Securities Exchange
("Shanghai Regulations") and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
("Shenzhen Regulations"). 90 Through the enactment of the National
Securities Law, China's central government attempted to reconcile
and standardize the local laws and regulations in the two securities
exchanges.91
Before the enactment of the National Securities Law which defined
the roles of the different administrative agencies, various government
units, both at the central government level and at the provincial level,
competed for control over the emerging financial markets. 2 These
agencies imposed many confusing and sometimes contradicting tern-
90. The Shanghai Exchange, formed in 1990, is governed primarily by the Admin-
istrative Measures of Shanghai Municipality Governing Securities Trading, China L.
Foreign Bus. (CCH) 1 91-038 (1992) [hereinafter Shanghai Regulations]. Its counter-
part in Shenzhen is the Provisional Measures of Shenzhen Municipality on Share Issu-
ing and Trading, China L. Foreign Bus. (CCI) 73-553 (1992) [hereinafter Shenzhen
Regulations]. Before the enactment of the provisional National Securities Law in
1993, these local municipal laws were the principal governing laws. Afterward, these
laws supplement the National Securities Law.
91. The reach of the provisional National Securities Law is expanding. In January,
1996, the central government took control of the B share market. See infra part m.C
(discussing the nature of the B shares). The listing of B shares is now subject to
approval by the central government, rather than local regulators. See Renee Lai, Bei-
jing Tightens Grip Over B-Shares, S. China Morning Post, Jan. 3, 1996, at 1 (describing
the new regulation), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current News File.
92. For example, before the enactment of the National Securities Law, the central
bank (the People's Bank of China) issued provisional rules from time to time to regu-
late the stock market. Simultaneously, a multitude of other agencies also claimed
similar authority and issued regulating measures.
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porary regulatory measures. The National Securities Law stipulates
that the Securities Committee of the State Council ("SCSC") is the
national authority responsible for the overall control of China's secur-
ities markets.93 The China Securities Regulatory Commission
("CSRC"), the administrative arm of the SCSC, is responsible for
drafting and implementing policies and regulations regarding market
supervision.94 In addition, the State Commission for Restructuring
the Economic System directly oversees the reorganization of state en-
terprises into joint stock companies. 5 The National Securities Law
thus greatly clarifies the previously confusing channels of
administration.
Although the National Securities Law adopted most of the pre-ex-
isting local regulations and administrative measures utilized in Shang-
hai and Shenzhen, thereby giving investors legal certainties in their
equity investments, it also modified some of the local rules. For exam-
ple, the National Securities Law raised the minimum number of indi-
vidual shareholders for a publicly listed company to 1000 from 800 in
the Shenzhen Regulations and from 500 in the Shanghai Regula-
tions. 96 This increase in the minimum number of shareholders pre-
sumably reflects the government's concern about the appearance of
"privatization," where control of companies lies in the hands of a few
individuals.97 To ensure market liquidity and maintain widespread
share ownership, the National Securities Law also stipulates that if the
total share capital to be issued is less than RMB 400 million yuan (a
minimum of RMB 50 million yuan in capital is required to satisfy the
listing requirement), at least 25% of the shares must be issued to the
public.98 This requirement is more stringent than the previous local
regulations.
To reorganize state enterprises, the National Securities Law specifi-
cally requires the government unit administering the state-owned as-
sets to give approval for the asset transfers. 99 The State Council, or its
delegates, is responsible for determining the proportion of state own-
93. National Securities Law, supra note 13, art. 5.
94. Id Note that although Commerce Clearing House ("CCH") has translated
this executive branch as the China Securities Supervision and Management Commit-
tee, the more common translation is China Securities Regulatory Commission
("CSRC"). See, e.g., Yi-Chen Zhang & Da Yu, China's Emerging Securities Market,
Colum. J. World Bus., Summer 1994, at 112, 118 (referring to the committee as the
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)).
95. See China Bus. L. Guide (CCH) 38-315 (1993).
96. National Securities Law, supra note 13, art. 30.
97. See supra note 54 (noting Chinese Constitution and statutes which extol the
virtues of socialist ownership).
98. National Securities Law, supra note 13, art. 8.
99. Id arts. 9, 36. The highest level agency in this regard is the State Commission
for Restructuring the Economic System. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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ership.'t ° Of particular concern are two additional conditions in the
National Securities Law. First, the enterprise's net assets must be at
least 30% of the total gross assets, and the enterprise's intangible as-
sets must constitute no more than 20% of the total assets.10' Second,
the enterprise must have been profitable for three years prior to the
new share offering." z The local Shenzhen Regulations further require
that a company listed on that exchange must show a return on invest-
ment of at least 10% before going public.'0 3 The combined net effect
of these requirements is that only profitable enterprises with signifi-
cant book value can be reorganized into joint stock companies.'04
While the current securities laws seek to protect market integrity at
this embryonic stage of market development by ensuring that only rel-
atively healthy state companies are traded on the exchanges, the laws
also may have inadvertently contravened the original economic intent
of state sector reorganization. These minimum profitability and asset
value requirements prevent the most inefficient or near bankrupt state
enterprises-those most in need of additional equity capital-from
entering the market and getting the capital they desperately need to
improve their operations.
Similar to the Company Law, the National Securities Law requires
the promoter to subscribe at least 35% of the total shares with a mini-
mum value of RMB 30 million yuan. 0 5 Further, only one class of
100. National Securities Law, supra note 13, art. 9. The regulatory regime does not
specify exactly how to determine the government's portion of the share. Presumably
it is subject to negotiation. As a starting point for the negotiation, the government
appears to be using the book value of the enterprise. The government has also estab-
lished a state asset administration agency to monitor and value state assets in the
converted state enterprises. See China Bus. L. Guide (CCII) 1 38-315 (1993).
101. National Securities Law, supra note 13, art. 9(1). How to compute the net
asset value (ie. gross asset value net of accumulated depreciation) in China is still an
open question. Many accounting rules in China are archaic. For example, contrary.to
international accounting standard ("IAS"), China still applies straight line deprecia-
tion to calculate the book value of its assets. Julia W. Sze, The Allure of B Shares,
China Bus. Rev. (Jan.-Feb. 1993), at 42, 47 (listing the major differences between the
positions of IAS and those in China).
102. National Securities Law, supra note 13, art. 9(2). These requirements are
more stringent and specific than the local laws in Shanghai and Shenzhen; see Shang-
hai Regulations, supra note 90, art. 11 (requiring that company must be profitable for
the last two years). Contra Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 90, Ch. III (no specific
requirements on company profitability). It should also be noted that net income or
profit is calculated differently in China compared to other western economies. See
Sze, supra note 101.
103. See Share Trading in Shenzhen, China Bus. L. Guide (CCH) 38-530 (1993).
104. One advantage of these requirements is that they prevent investors from buy-
ing into bankrupt enterprises for the sake of speculating in land value. Many state
enterprises currently occupy prime land in major cities. It is possible for investors to
take control of the bankrupt company and proceed to strip its valuable assets-in this
case, the land. In fact, this is a fairly common speculating tactic used in developing
countries. Investors seek control of a company with no intention to run the business.
Rather, the intent is to sell the company's highly valuable properties.
105. National Securities Law, supra note 13, art. 8.
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common shares may be issued per year, which again limits manage-
ment's operational flexibility.' 06
C. Share Classifications
One of the most problematic aspects of China's current securities
regulatory regime is that stocks are separated into different classes
based upon the nature of the shareholders. These classes include:
state shares, legal person shares, individual shares, and foreign invest-
ment shares. °7 This distinctive classification scheme reflects the ideo-
logical debates concerning stock issuance, especially the sensitive
question of socialist ownership, and represents the government's at-
tempt to be pragmatic in its market development. 08
State shares are shares held by state-owned units designated by the
government'0 9 and may be sold or transferred only with the approval
of the respective state asset administrative departments. 110 These
shares are not publicly traded. Legal person shares are shares held by
a company, usually another state enterprise, or legal entity other than
the state or a natural person."' As with state shares, the transfer of
legal person shares requires approval by the relevant authorities.112
Together, state shares and legal person shares account for approxi-
mately 75% of the total number of all common shares issued.13
Individual shares are those held by either the staff and workers of
the company or individual investors." 4 These shares are authorized
to trade publicly on the national exchanges and are referred to as "A
shares." Only Chinese nationals may purchase these shares." 5
Foreign investment shares (special RMB shares) are issued to per-
sons outside China and are used to attract foreign investment and to
106. Id. arts. 8, 10.
107. See, e.g., Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 90, art. 33 (stating that depending
on the owner, shares shall be divided into four different categories).
108. See supra part II; see also Chen, supra note 17, at 5 (noting that "maintaining
the dominant position of [state] ownership to preserve socialism is... a virtual pre-
condition for China's stock market to emerge").
109. See Zhang & Yu, supra note 94, at 119. It is not known exactly what a state-
owned unit is. The term is deliberately vague and should be broadly defined. Pre-
sumably, any government agency wbuld fall into this category.
110. See National Securities Law, supra note 13, art. 36.
111. See Zhang & Yu, supra note 94, at 119.
112. See Mark O'Neill, China Leaders Seen Divided Over State Share Sales, Reuter
Asia-Pac. Bus. Rep., Jan. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current News
File ("State shares are directly held by the state and legal-person shares are held by
institutions, most of them state-owned. Neither can be traded.").
113. See Securities Regulation Climate Improves, But Obstacles Remain, 9 Int'l Sec.
Reg. Rep., No. 7, Mar. 14, 1996, at 11 (noting that "[o]nly about 25 percent of issued
shares can circulate and the rest are restricted by being classified as state or legal-
person shares").
114. See Zhang & Yu, supra note 94, at 119.
115. Id.
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assist the development of securities markets.1 6 These shares, which
are listed in the two national exchanges, are called "B shares" and are
denominated, traded, and settled in US dollars." 7 B share owners
possess identical rights and obligations as A share owners." 8
State enterprises that reincorporate as joint stock companies and
intend to apply for listing in Hong Kong may also issue shares denom-
inated in RMB. 1 9 These shares, however, are only listed and traded
in Hong Kong dollars on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. °2 0 These
shares are made available only to overseas investors and are referred
to as "H shares."'21 Enterprises with H shares may not issue or list B
shares in China, but they can have concurrent listings of A shares in
China and H shares in Hong Kong."z
Apparently, these multiple categories of shares serve the govern-
ment's overriding goal of preserving a controlling stake of the state
sector. With only about 25% of all shares permitted to trade publicly
under the current securities regulatory regime, the government effec-
tively maintains a controlling stake in virtually every publicly traded
state enterprise. 23 State ownership and control of enterprises are
thus ensured. As one commentator states, "[the remaining question
is] how to integrate the participation rights of shareholders into the
existing managerial system without undermining the state's control as
the largest shareholder while allowing other shareholders to have a
reasonable opportunity to influence the management."' 4 The issu-
ance of B shares and H shares then serves merely to attract the for-
eign capital needed to modernize operations in the state sector.' 2s
116. Nottle, supra note 10, at 505. Apparently, the government also hopes that
more sophisticated trading in the foreign investment share markets will serve as a
guidepost for domestic investors. Unfortunately, domestic investors have virtually ig-
nored these markets and simply focused on short-term speculations in the A share
market.
117. Id. Originally, B shares were denominated in RMB. Id.
118. Id.; see also National Securities Law, supra note 13, art. 8 (stating that "only
one type of common stock shall be issued with equal rights for equal shares").
119. See Nottle, supra note 10, at 516.
120. Id. The price settlement method is similar to that of the American Depository
Receipts ("ADRs") in the U.S. exchanges. For a discussion of the ADRs, see Charles
P. Jones, Investments 419-20 (1996). The currency conversion rate is determined by
the average exchange rates at China's currency swap centers.
121. See Nottle, supra note 10, at 516.
122. Id. Thus, state enterprises that wish to issue foreign investment shares have a
basic choice between B or H shares. Of course, they can also issue A shares. H
shares in the form of ADRs for some state enterprises are also listed on the New York
Stock Exchange, and they are sometimes referred to as "N shares." See World Bank
Report Urges Restraint in Regulating Capital Markets, 9 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep., No. 6,
Feb. 29, 1996, at 11.
123. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
124. Zheng, supra note 9, at 608.
125. That China is not interested in wholesale privatization and the associated
changes in organizational structure can be seen from comments of investment bank-
ers. See Breaking the Taboo, supra note 20, at 83 ("'It's [merely] a cash-raising exer-
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Perhaps the most egregious flaw in this system, however, is the
manner in which it distorts the fair pricing function of an efficient
stock market. As one author states, "[a]n efficient market (EM) is
one in which the prices of all securities quickly and fully reflect all
available information about the assets. This concept postulates that
investors will assimilate all relevant information into prices in making
their buy and sell decisions."' 26 Theoretically, assuming that the con-
ditions for an efficient market apply, if one categorizes stock classes
according to the fundamental characteristics of the underlying stocks,
as with common and preferred stocks, the market is said to be effi-
cient with respect to the particular class of stocks. As such, the mar-
ket price of the stock fairly reflects the value of the company. Given
this "efficient price," one can apply a standard model to estimate the
company's implied cost of equity capital.'27
China's current securities regulatory scheme subdivides one class of
stocks (i.e. common stocks) with the same basic characteristics into
four groups according to the nature of the stockholders. Under this
arrangement, it is not clear whether the traditional efficient market
concept still applies. Even if the concept applies, there would be four
"efficient prices" for essentially the same securities. Further, there is
no theoretical basis to prefer one price over the other in computing
the implied cost of equity. The potential economic and financial
problems caused by China's regulatory regime are discussed in detail
in the following part.
IV. CORPORATE FINANCE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT
SEcuRITIEs REGULATORY REGIME
One of the principal motivations behind the government's drive to
create an equity market was the establishment of a major source of
capital to revitalize the country's ailing state enterprises. These enter-
prises are critical to China's economic health because many of them
produce important intermediate goods (raw materials, chemicals, etc.)
necessary for China's booming economy.128 China also hopes that the
new equity market will channel the country's huge private savings
base into capital investment and lessen the pressure of inflation by
dampening consumer spending. In addition, competition for invest-
ment funds in the open market is expected to discipline state-sector
managers to raise productivity and profits. 2 9 Therefore, the develop-
cise.' . . . '[B]asically they acted like the old state-owned enterprises they always
were."' (quoting comments from investment bankers in China)).
126. Jones, supra note 120, at 269.
127. See infra note 140; see also infra part IV (detailing the pricing problems cre-
ated by the current securities regulatory regime in China).
128. See Johns, supra note 21, at 916 n.23 (observing that state enterprises dominate
important industries in China); see also supra part I (discussing the significance and
problems of China's state sector).
129. Sze, supra note 101, at 42.
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ment of a modem financial market in China serves the dual goals of
China's economic reform plan: improving production efficiency and
stimulating economic growth. The securities regulatory regime can be
viewed as a statutory attempt to ensure the success of the economic
modernization process. Paradoxically, rather than enhancing market
development, the current securities regulatory regime may actually
stifle the potential effectiveness of the financial marketplace.
As noted earlier, there are many idiosyncratic provisions under the
current securities regulatory regime in China. For instance, the new
Company Law stipulates that a joint stock company must limit the
issuance of bonds to at most 40% of its total assets." The securities
regulatory regime thus artificially constricts the joint stock company's
capital structure by requiring that a company be at least 60% equity
financed. This requirement places an unduly large premium on the
importance of the equity stock market.
An even more serious problem exists in stock classifications. By
separately classifying A, B, and H shares, China's securities regulatory
regime essentially bifurcates the stock market into the A shares do-
mestic fund market, and the B and H shares foreign fund market.13'
In effect, the domestic and the foreign fund markets are affected by
totally separate supply and demand forces. This bifurcation results in
divergent pricing for shares with the same rights in a given
company.132
In the domestic fund stock market, with relatively few stocks listed
on the two national exchanges, 33 there is simply too much money
chasing too limited a supply of shares."M As a result, the A shares are
grossly overvalued relative to B or H shares. In 1992, price earnings
multiples ("P/Es") for the A shares market were estimated at 120
times for stocks on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 135 times for
those on the Shanghai exchange. 35 In contrast, foreign investors were
much more cautious towards the prospect of the reorganized state en-
terprises. The average company's B shares traded at a 60-70% dis-
130. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
131. See supra part I.
132. An added source of price fluctuations in the foreign fund market is currency
fluctuation. Foreign investors will thus also factor this currency risk into their pricing
of the stock.
133. At the end of 1995, there were 13 million investors for 361 listed stocks. Bo
Ning, Stock Investors Reach 13 Million in China, Xinhua News Agency, June 26, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current News File.
134. Chen, supra note 17, at 11-12; see also Qian, supra note 57, at 71 (stating that
"market is too small to supply demand").
135. See Nottle, supra note 10, at 510-12. The P/E ratio is a popular measure of the
stock market price level. In essence, it measures how much money investors are will-
ing to pay for $1 per period of future earnings. As a comparison, the average market
P/Es in the United States typically fall between 15 to 22.
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count to the A share price.' 36 Therefore, segregating and classifying
separate portions of the stock market under the securities regulatory
regime greatly distorts share prices. As discussed later, this price dis-
tortion causes significant problems in internal cost of capital estima-
tion for state enterprises.
In terms of wealth distribution, the current regime also creates
unearned windfall profits for the few investors fortunate enough to
own individual shares that can be legally traded on the stock ex-
changes. These profits stem directly from the non-transferability of
state and legal person shares. Because of the trading restriction, the
state is transferring part of its possible earnings in price appreciation
to a few individuals. 37 Ironically, the securities regulatory regime-
which seeks to further the socialist purpose of state ownership-is
supposed to prevent precisely this uneven, and sometimes unfair,
wealth distribution from occurring. 138
Perhaps more importantly for China at this juncture is that the
stock market should function as an assessor of each state enterprise's
internal cost of capital. The legislative drafters and regulatory offi-
cials, however, are apparently too preoccupied with the investment
function of a stock market-attracting capital to joint stock compa-
nies. The more fundamental economic function of a stock market-
facilitating the efficient allocation of scarce resources-is ignored
under the current securities regulatory regime.
At the moment, even after converting a state enterprise into a joint
stock company under the Company Law and publicly offering its
stocks for trading under the securities laws, the pressure on the state
enterprise's manager to perform well remains minimal. The state still
maintains effective public ownership, and private investors have very
limited influence on management. Additionally, profitability alone is
136. ld. at 513. Thus, in Shenzhen, a typical B share would have a P/E ratio of
approximately between 34 to 36, similar to that of a growth stock in the United States.
Even at this more modest level, the P/E still appears to be high by international stan-
dards. As a comparison, U.S. stocks with premium international brandnames such as
Coca Cola and McDonald's are presently commanding a P/E of 37 and 21, respec-
tively. Robert McGough & Eleena De Lisser, PIE Reaches Stars at Planet Hollywood,
Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1996, at C1. Presently, most H shares (those shares that are listed
in New York) are trading at a P/E ratio of below 10, reflecting a even more conserva-
tive view from U.S. investors. See Breaking the Taboo, supra note 20, at 81.
137. To illustrate, if the state decided to publicly trade its shares on the exchanges,
the stock price would certainly decline because of the substantial increase in the sup-
ply of shares. At present, the government is in effect "cornering" the entire market
which artificially increases the general share prices. Because state shares are neither
traded nor alienable, all resulting profits are passed to investors who actively trade
their shares. This benefits only a few shareholders.
138. See supra part II. Some commentators also suggest that the current process
leads to widespread corruption among government officials who control the share
distribution process. See Qian, supra note 57, at 72 (observing that "[f]airness, justice,
and openness in securities transactions [in China] are not embraced nor sufficiently
institutionalized").
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not precise enough to determine efficiency. The key issue is the ade-
quacy of the profit given the risk, because all capital has an opportu-
nity cost that must be recouped before one can estimate the pure
economic profit.
139
Modem corporate finance theory emphasizes the role of an efficient
stock market in determining the cost of equity capital. In the absence
of this information, an enterprise cannot achieve efficient allocation of
financial resources."4 This estimate of the cost of equity capital, to-
gether with information on the company's cost of debt capital, allows
the company to derive its overall average cost.'4' This overall average
cost is the firm's marginal or opportunity cost of capital. For optimal
profitability and maximum capital allocation efficiency, a firm should
continue to raise and invest money until the rate of return from the
last viable project equals the firm's overall cost of capital. In China,
therefore, a fully functioning stock market could theoretically provide
state enterprise managers with the necessary information to compute
the entity's overall cost of capital, thus allowing them to rationally
choose efficient project investments. The missing link here, however,
139. For example, instead of investing in a profitable project X, it is more rational
to invest in an even more profitable project Y if Y has the same risk as X.
140. Under the assumption that the stock market is efficient, one way for the firm
to estimate this "implied" cost of equity capital is to apply the discounted cash flow
model. In its simplest form (it is often referred to as the Constant Growth or Gordon
Model), this model expresses the cost of equity as the summation of the expected
dividend yield and the potential capital gains yield. Mathematically, assuming that
the annual dividends of the company will increase at a constant rate of g%, the fair
market price of the stock can be calculated as:P = Dl/(K - g);
where K, is the firm's cost of equity capital, D, is the expected dividend one period
from now, P is the current market price of the stock, and g is the estimated long term
earnings or dividend growth rate. Now, if the enterprise wants to estimate its cost of
equity, it can convert the above price equation into:
K, = DIP + g.
If stock investors are rational, the company can use the prevailing stock price for P
and calculate K, directly. The problem in China is that prices for A shares, B shares,
and H shares are different. A company in China, therefore, could not select the ap-
propriate P since A, B, and H share prices are all feasible candidates. Lacking P, the
company cannot estimate its own cost of equity, K. See also Van Home, supra note
62, at 26-35 (detailing the stock valuation model); cf. supra note 64 (same).
141. This is referred to as the weighted average cost of capital (-WACC") for the
firm, it is calculated as:
WACC = B/V(Kd)(1-T) + S/V(K,);
where BV is the proportion of debt (B) relative to total asset (V), Yd is the cost of
debt, T is the tax rate (since interest is tax deductible, the actual cost of debt for the
firm is (Kd)(1-T)), SIV is the proportion of equity, and K is the cost of equity. See J.
Fred Weston et al., Essentials of Managerial Finance 583-84 (1996) (examining the
WACC formula). As discussed earlier, the current securities regulatory regime in
China prevents the reasonable calculation of K,. See supra note 140. Lacking the cost
of equity, K,, the enterprise would not be able to estimate its WACC.
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is a rationally and efficiently determined share price upon which to
base such calculations. 142
Presently, China's securities regulatory regime obstructs the calcu-
lation of any reasonable estimate of the firm's cost of capital because
the regime artificially distorts share prices. Instead of providing infor-
mation on the firm's future prospects, the current stock prices merely
reflect a distorted supply and demand condition for the stock.143
Moreover, the regulatory regime's restriction on the company's capi-
tal structure also adversely affects the company's cost of capital. 44
Ironically, for the few publicly traded state enterprises, reliance on
modern finance theory to calculate the cost of capital will lead to
over-investment, because the implied cost of equity is unrealistically
low as calculated from the current share prices.145
In sum, China's prevailing securities regulatory regime has essen-
tially destroyed a crucial function of the stock market-providing the
manager with the necessary information to make optimal project in-
vestment decisions-and has contravened the original intent of
China's experiment in stock markets. 146
142. One can argue that the enterprise's manager may still come up with a reason-
able estimate of capital cost by using the prices of B or H shares (the foreign fund
shares). The prices for these shares, however, are greatly distorted. First, there is
currency risk for foreign funds. Second, there is political risk for foreign buyers.
Third, and most importantly, there is an information gap, in the form of either incom-
plete information content or additional information arrival time, preventing accurate
pricing of the foreign shares. All of these disadvantages create additional uncertainty
to stock pricing.
Also, for a non-publicly traded company with no stock market price information, a
popular technique in the United States is to use a proxy company that is listed in the
market. Unfortunately, one would face the same fundamental problem of a segre-
gated market in China. Perhaps this would explain the obsolete practice of emphasiz-
ing accounting book value (gross asset value minus accumulated depreciation) in
China's securities regulatory regime. This practice contradicts modem finance the-
ory's focus on the economic value of an asset, i.e., the expected cash flows that can be
generated from an asset.
143. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
144. The overall cost of capital for the company is a weighted average of the com-
pany's cost of debt and cost of equity. See supra note 141. Because the cost of debt is
always lower than the cost of equity for the company, an unnecessarily high level of
equity in the company's capital structure will raise the company's WACC, i.e. its over-
all cost of capital.
145. Obviously, the higher the price of a company's stock, the lower its cost of
equity capital and the lower the overall cost of capital. See supra notes 140-41. With
lower capital cost, the company can invest in more projects. However, if the stock
price is made artificially high, the company would invest in some projects it should not
have originally invested.
146. After all, the country's experiments in joint ventures, which rely on private
contracting, have been very successful in attracting foreign capital. Arguably, simple
modifications in the current joint venture laws could allow domestic private capital to
invest in state enterprises. There is no absolute need to rely on stock market to raise
funds, even though a stock market can serve as a valuable alternative or complemen-
tary means of fund raising. China then would not need to confront the sensitive sub-
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CONCLUSION
China's current securities regulatory regime reflects a careful polit-
ical balance between the socialist ideal of state ownership and the cap-
italist theory of economic efficiency. Although in many respects the
securities legislation in China is quite similar to those found in more
mature economies and is rather sophisticated, the legislation contains
some uniquely socialist characteristics not found in Western markets
that are antithetical to traditional market principles.
If the real motivation behind the legislation is to institute market
discipline on the many inefficiently run state enterprises, however, the
current legislation will most likely fail to achieve this goal. The mar-
ket, as constructed in China today, cannot reasonably determine the
prices of shares. Consequently, managers of state enterprises cannot
make rational project investment decisions because they lack informa-
tion on their own company's market-determined cost of capital. On
the other hand, given the nascent state of the current securities regula-
tory regime, modifications are bound to be made in the future. Mean-
while, China must deal with a securities market that is not effectuating
the basic goal of its policy makers.
ject of private ownership of state assets in a socialist state, which was brought about
by the first issuance of equity stocks.
As an example, China could allow the formation of domestic investment funds,
such as mutual funds or venture capitalist funds. This would pool together individual
savings and establish capital joint ventures with existing state enterprises in new
projects. Alternatively, the funds could simply infuse capital into existing state enter-
prises as an equity partner.
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